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MORTGAGE SUBSTITUTES-THE LAW IN ARKANSAS
Glenn E. Pasvogel, Jr.*
I. Short History of Mortgage Law
A mortgage is a device whereby a creditor acquires an interest in a
debtor's real property to secure repayment of a debt.1 In the event of
default in the repayment obligation, the creditor/mortgagee may have
the real estate sold and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of the
debtor/mortgagor's indebtedness.2 Recording statutes protect the mort-
gagee against competing liens on the real estate and assure that the
mortgage will not be defeated by a subsequent bona fide purchaser. 3
The mortgage, as we know it today, did not exist during the early
commonlaw periods. A lender who desired security in a debtor's real
estate would require that the debtor actually convey the real estate to
the lender, usually in the form of a fee simple upon condition subse-
quent.4 By the terms of the conveyance, repayment of the obligation by
a certain day (called the "law day") gave the mortgagor the right to
reenter and terminate the lender's estate.5
The conveyance of a fee interest in the debtor's land gave the
lender all the incidents of legal title to the real estate.6 The lender was
entitled to any accessions to the real estate and received compensation
if the land was taken by eminent domain.7 The property was subject to
the dower rights of the lender's spouse and the claims of his creditors. 8
It passed to his heirs upon his death.9 Most important, the lender had
the right to possession (although the debtor customarily remained in
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; B.A. 1967, Elmhurst College; J.D.
1970, DePaul University. This article was made possible by a summer research grant from the
Arkansas Bar Foundation.
I. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.1, at I (2d ed. 1985).
2. ld. at 4.
3. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER. MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6.18, at 81 (2d
ed. 1981). For a thorough discussion of the purposes and types of recording acts, see 4 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 (A. James Casner ed. 1952).
4. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note I, § 1.2, at 6.
5. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER. supra note 3, § 1.2, at 30.





possession) and the right to rents and profits."0 The lender's "fee" came
out of the rents and profits because the charging of any interest on a
loan was usurious and illegal."
The above system frequently worked extreme injustice on the
mortgagor. A balloon repayment was due on "law day.' 1 2 If for any
reason the payment was not made, the mortgagor forfeited all interest
in the property even though he was still obligated to pay the debt.' 3
Equity eventually intervened to ameliorate this harshness.' 4 If the
mortgagor could show that failure to pay promptly was due to fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of the lender, the chancellor would, upon
payment of the debt in full, void the forfeiture and order the property
returned to the mortgagor. 15 Eventually, equity allowed the mortgagor
to redeem his property as of right without showing any special grounds
for relief.' 6 This right came to be known as the mortgagor's "equity of
redemption" and became a recognized equitable estate in land. 
7
The recognition of an equity of redemption posed a serious threat
to the stability of land titles since a mortgagor could recover the prop-
erty at any time by paying off the underlying debt. 8 To remedy this,
equity developed foreclosure as the formal proceeding that would cut
off the equity of redemption." The foreclosure decree ordered the
mortgagor to pay the debt within a specified period of time or lose the
right to redeem and suffer a forfeiture of the land in satisfaction of the
obligation.20 This type of "strict foreclosure" resulted in a vesting of
clear title in the mortgagee in full satisfaction of indebtedness regard-
less of the value of the property.'
Depending upon the relationship between the value of the land and
the amount of the debt, strict foreclosure frequently resulted in a wind-
fall for one party or the other."' Thus, in the United States, the pre-
dominant method of foreclosure that evolved resulted in a public sale of
10. Id. at 7.
11. G. OSBORNE. HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 13 (1951).
12. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. supra note I, § 1.2, at 7.
13. Id. See also 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 16.5, at 17.
14. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 16.6, at 17.
15. Id. at 17-18.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id. The term "equity of redemption" first appears in Duchess of Hamilton v. Countess of
Dirlton, I Ch. Rep. 165 (1654).
18. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, § 16.10, at 27.
22. Id. at 27-28.
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the property after giving notice to all interested parties .2  The mort-
gage debt was credited with the proceeds of the sale and the mortgagor
was entitled to any surplus over the amount of the debt and expenses of
foreclosure. 4 If the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to discharge
the debt, the mortgagee was entitled to collect the deficiency from
other assets of the mortgagor.2 5
In the United States, as in England, the mortgagor could redeem
the property any time after default but before foreclosure by paying
the mortgagee the accelerated debt plus accumulated interest.26 The
equity of redemption was considered so important that courts refused
to enforce clauses in mortgage instruments wherein mortgagors pur-
ported to waive or modify the right.2 ' This came to be known as the
rule against "clogging the equity of redemption."2
II. Attempting to Avoid Foreclosure and the Equity of Redemp-
tion-Mortgage Substitutes
In a pure mortgage transaction, the mortgagor gives the mortga-
gee (1) a promissory note promising to repay the loan according to
specified tenure and (2) a mortgage giving the mortgagee an interest in
the property to secure repayment. Upon default, the mortgagee must
bring a foreclosure action in chancery, join all parties having an inter-
est in the property, and have the property sold at public sale. The prop-
erty may be redeemed by the mortgagor until sold 2 and, in most juris-
dictions, may be redeemed for a statutorily prescribed period of time
after the sale."0 In order to be relieved from the time and expense of
foreclosure and to deprive the mortgagor of the equity of redemption,
lenders have long sought devices that would create security in real es-
tate but which would not be treated as mortgages so as to require fore-
closure or create an equity of redemption.
23. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note I, § 1.4, at 9.
24. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY. supra note 3, § 16.10, at 28.
25. Id.
26. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. supra note 1, § 3.1, at 29-35.
27. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 3, § 1.3(a), at 31.
28. See generally G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 96-99, at 227-
38 (1951).
29. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 478; Shinn v. Barrie, 182 Ark. 366,
367, 31 S.W.2d 540, 541 (1930).
30. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.1, at 478. In Arkansas the statutory re-
demption period is one year, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1111 (1971), unless waived by the mortgagor.
Shinn v. Barrie, 182 Ark. 366, 31 S.W.2d 540 (1930).
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A. Deed of Trust
Probably the most common mortgage substitute is the deed of
trust. The mortgagor/trustor conveys the real estate to a third party
trustee to hold as security for repayment of the mortgage debt to the
lender. The trust instrument will usually give the trustee a power of
sale over the property in the event of default. The burdens of foreclo-
sure are alleviated only to the extent that a state's regulation of powers
of sale is less rigorous than judicial foreclosure. 31 Most jurisdictions,
including Arkansas,3 2 will treat a deed of trust like a mortgage for
most purposes. 8
B. Absolute Deed with Option to Purchase
On its face, a deed of trust looks like a security device and is
therefore treated like a mortgage. What many lenders really want is a
device that can be used for security but which looks like something else
entirely at the time it is most likely to be scrutinized by the court -
after default. Instead of a mortgage, a lender may ask for a deed to the
property, it being orally understood that the lender will reconvey to the
borrower when the debt is paid. In the event of default, however, the
lender will record the deed and hope to appear to all the world as a
purchaser-no foreclosure, no equity of redemption. Since the timing
of the payment, execution of the deed, and recording of the deed sug-
gest so transparently a secured transaction rather than a sale, the
transaction will usually be structured as a current and promptly re-
corded sale of real estate with the seller retaining an option to repur-
chase the property at some future date for some specified amount.
Thus, at the time a dispute arises as to the character of the transaction,
it will facially look like a sale of real estate.
1. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
A, in need of money, approaches B for a loan. B takes a deed from
A as security and advances A the money. B records the deed and
agrees to reconvey to A upon A's repayment. A defaults and B sues to
31. It would appear that in Arkansas foreclosure by power of sale is more onerous than that
of judicial foreclosure. The property must be appraised by three disinterested appraisers, ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 51-1113 (1971), and the property must be sold for at least two-thirds of its ap-
praised value. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-1112 to -13 (1971). This restriction has been held not to
apply to judicial foreclosures. Gregory v. Rubel, 184 Ark. 55, 60, 41 S.W.2d 771, 773 (1931).
32. Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429, 436-37 (1876).
33. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 1.6, at I1.
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quiet title and regain possession. A, who has built up some equity in
the property, claims the transaction was a mortgage and seeks to
redeem.
The law is well-settled that a deed, absolute on its face, is pre-
sumed to be a conveyance.34 However, where the parties intend a deed
to be security for a debt, a court will admit evidence as to the true
character of the transaction. 36 To overcome the presumption that a
deed is intended to effect a conveyance, the party claiming it to be a
mortgage must establish by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that the deed was intended to secure a debt."
2. Evidence Tending to Show a Deed is Operating as a
Mortgage
In Beloate v. Taylor 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court established a
two-part test for determining whether a deed operated as a conveyance
or a mortgage:
1. Did the grantor owe the grantee a debt at the time of the
conveyance; and
2. If so, was the deed of conveyance intended to secure the
debt?
An occasional Arkansas case has been decided upon the existence
or nonexistence of a debt between the grantor and grantee at the time
of the conveyance. For example, in Rogers v. Snow Brothers Hardware
Co.38 J.W. Rogers paid a debt owed by his son, W.L. Rogers. In re-
turn, W.L. Rogers executed a warranty deed conveying to his brothers
the undivided one-fourth interest in lands owned by his father and
which he expected to inherit. The deed was delivered to his father with
34. Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237, 242, 47 S.W.2d 18, 21 (1932);
Deloney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053, 1055, 40 S.W.2d 772, 773 (1931).
35. The parole evidence rule is not violated by doing so. The rule only precludes introduction
of evidence that would vary or contradict a written document. Lane v. Pfeifer, 264 Ark. 162, 167,
568 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1978). Any written or oral evidence is admissible to show that a deed
absolute was intended as security. Ehrlich v. Castleberry, 227 Ark. 426, 429, 299 S.W.2d 38, 40
(1957). Such evidence does not vary or contradict the instrument, but only explains its purpose or
function.
36. Patterson v. Webster, 252 Ark. 596, 598, 480 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1972). "The law
presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is on the one
claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence." Deloney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053, 1055, 40 S.W.2d 772, 773 (1931). The evidence
"'must be sufficient to satisfy every reasonable mind without hesitation." Clark-McWilliams Coal
Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237, 242, 47 S.W.2d 18, 21 (1932).
37. 202 Ark. 229, 233, 150 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (1941).
38. 186 Ark. 183, 52 S.W.2d 969 (1932).
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the express understanding that it should be returned should W.L. repay
his father at any time before his father's death.
J.W. Rogers died without having been repaid and the deed, found
among his papers, was later recorded. Snow Brothers, a creditor of
W.L. Rogers, sued to set aside the deed in order to execute its judg-
ment against the inheritance of W.L. Rogers. The Arkansas Supreme
Court found that W.L.'s deed to his brothers was not effective as either
a mortgage or a conveyance. Since W.L. owed no money to his broth-
ers, there was no debt for the transfer to secure and for that reason
there could be no mortgage.3 9 The conveyance, however, was held to
have been ineffective for lack of delivery of the deed to the grantees.
The second part of the Beloate test requires that the parties intend
that the conveyance secure the debt. As early as 1852, the Arkansas
Supreme Court stated the general rule for determining the intent of the
parties:
And for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the par-
ties, it is a well established rule, that the courts will not be limited to
the terms of the written contract, but will consider all the circum-
stances connected with it; such as the circumstances of the parties, the
property conveyed, its value, the price paid for it, defeasance verbal or
written, as well as the acts and declarations of the parties, and will
decide upon the contract and the circumstances taken together.
40
Seldom do the parties come to court agreeing that a deed was in-
tended as security,41 nor will the grantor often have a witness to cor-
roborate his testimony that the grantee promised to return the deed
upon repayment of the debt. 42 Most often the court must look to cir-
cumstantial evidence to determine whether a conveyance was intended
as security for a debt. Perhaps the most important evidence of intent to
create a mortgage is the continuing survival of the debt following exe-
cution of the deed.
48
39. Id. at 186, 52 S.W.2d at 970. See also Hershey v. Luce, 56 Ark. 302, 19 S.W. 963
(1892), in which the court found that a transaction intended by the parties to be a mortgage was a
conditional sale instead because there was no evidence of a debt or obligation between the parties
when the transaction was entered into.
40. Scott, White & Co. v. Henry & Cunningham, 13 Ark. 112, 116 (1852). The Scott rule
was quoted and followed by the Arkansas Supreme Court as recently as 1957 in Ehrlich v. Castle-
berry, 227 Ark. 426, 429-30, 299 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1957).
41. Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 480, 400 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1966).
42. Sturgis v. Hughes, 206 Ark. 946, 950, 178 S.W.2d 236, 238 (1944). However, the trans-
action was found to be a conveyance for other reasons.
43. Ehrlich v. Castleberry, 227 Ark. 426, 299 S.W.2d 38 (1957); Tyler v. Morgan, 214 Ark.
667, 217 S.W.2d 606 (1949); Gunnels v. Machen, 213 Ark. 800, 212 S.W.2d 702 (1948); New-
port v. Chandler, 206 Ark. 974, 178 S.W.2d 240 (1944); Beloate v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 229, 150
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If A is indebted to B and conveys land to B in full satisfaction of
the indebtedness, the transaction is in essence a sale, the consideration
for the conveyance being the forgiveness of the debt. If A, in response
to B's threats to sue A on the debt, conveys land to B and B agrees to
"reconvey to A upon A's payment of the debt," the transaction is in
substance a mortgage. B is primarily interested in being paid his debt
and only secondarily interested in the real estate as security therefor.
The primary distinction between the sale and the mortgage is the con-
tinued existence of the debt following the conveyance.
Assume that in the second situation above, instead of promising to
"reconvey" to A, B gives A an option to repurchase the property any
time within the next three years for the amount B paid for it (the debt)
plus interest at twelve percent. The transaction serves the same func-
tion as a mortgage, but is technically a conveyance with option to
repurchase.
In the early case of Porter v. Clements,44 the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that a conveyance wherein the grantor retains a right of
defeasance will be construed as a mortgage only if the debt survives the
conveyance; otherwise it will be deemed a conditional sale.45 The rule
was stated as follows in Hays v. Emerson:
46
It is insisted, however, that, the consideration for the deed being
a pre-existing debt owing by the grantor to the grantee, the contempo-
raneous agreement for an immediate resale of the property to the
grantor on credit for the same price stamps the conveyance as a secur-
ity for the debt merely, and not an absolute conveyance, regardless of
the real intention of the parties. Such is not the law. The contempora-
neous agreement for a resale and purchase does not, of itself, make
the deed a mortgage. The conveyance must be judged according to the
real intent of the parties. If there is a debt subsisting between the
parties, and it is the intention to continue the debt, it is a mortgage;
but if the conveyance extinguishes the debt, and the parties intend
that result, a contract for a resale at the same price does not destroy
the character of the deed as an absolute conveyance.4
Sometimes the continued existence of the debt after the convey-
S.W.2d 730 (1941); Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237, 47 S.W.2d 18 (1932);
DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053, 40 S.W.2d 772 (1931); Brewer v. Yancey, 159 Ark. 257, 251
S.W. 677 (1923); Henry v. Henry, 143 Ark. 607, 221 S.W. 481 (1920); Hays v. Emerson, 75 Ark.
551, 87 S.W. 1027 (1905); Porter v. Clements, 3 Ark. 364 (1841).
44. 3 Ark. 364 (1841).
45. Id. at 384 (citing Poindexter v. McCannon, I Dev. Eq. 273 (N.C.)).
46.. 75 Ark. 551, 87 S.W. 1027 (1905).
47. Id. at 554-55, 87 S.W. at 1028.
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ance is quite obvious, as when the grantor executes a promissory note
to the grantee.48 However, in most cases, the issue is not so easily re-
solved. As stated by Justice Knox in Newport v. Chandler: "In prac-
tice, the line of demarcation between a mortgage and a sale with a
right of repurchase is shadowy, and it is frequently a matter of great
difficulty to determine to which category a given transaction belongs." '49
One test advanced by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Newport is
whether, after the conveyance, there exists a reciprocity of rights be-
tween the parties.50 In both a sale with option to purchase and a condi-
tional sale the grantor may force a reconveyance through payment of a
specified amount; however, the transaction can be a mortgage only if
the grantee has the right to compel the grantor to pay the consideration
named as the quid pro quo for the reconveyance.
5 1
In Newport the appellants conveyed certain property to the appel-
lees by warranty deed for a consideration of $900. As part of the con-
tract, the appellees agreed to reconvey the property to the appellants
for $900 plus eight percent interest if such sum was paid within nine
months:
The said parties of the first part are to execute and deliver to the
party of the second part a warranty deed to the above property to-
gether with the abstract of title, and same are to be held by the firm
of Bare & Swett as an escrow item with the understanding and agree-
ment that in the event the said parties of the first part (appellants)
desire to do so, they can repurchase the property from the party of the
second part at and for the sum of $900 plus 8 per cent interest, pro-
vided, however, that they must make such purchase on or before nine
months after this date. In the meantime, the parties of the first part
bind themselves to maintain adequate insurance on said property to
protect at least the value of the principal and interest mentioned
herein and to pay all taxes legally assessed against said property dur-
ing such period of time.
If the parties of the first part should fail or refuse to comply with
all the stipulations hereinbefore mentioned at any time and during the
life of this contract, then they hereby authorize the said Bare & Swett
to deliver the deed and abstract to the party of the second part and
bind themselves to promptly surrender possession of the property
hereinbefore described to said party of the second part.
5 2
48. Tyler v. Morgan, 214 Ark. 667, 217 S.W.2d 606 (1949).
49. 206 Ark. 974, 980, 178 S.W.2d 240, 244 (1944).
50. Id. at 981, 178 S.W.2d at 244.
51. Id. at 981, 178 S.W.2d at 244-45.
52. Id. at 975, 178 S.W.2d at 242.
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Relying on Beloate v. Taylor 3 and Johnson v. Clark," the court
ruled that the transaction was a conditional sale and not a mortgage
because the appellee had neither expressly nor impliedly agreed to re-
pay the money and there was consequently no surviving debt.5 This
was true although the grantors remained in possession and were respon-
sible for taxes and insurance, the deed was placed in escrow during the
option period, and the repurchase price was measured by the sale price
plus "interest"-a term having meaning only in connection with the
loan of money. The transaction was the functional equivalent of a
mortgage and had all the earmarks of a mortgage save the one found
controlling-the absence of an enforceable surviving debt."
53. 202 Ark. 229, 150 S.W.2d 730 (1941).
54. 5 Ark. 321 (1844). In determining that a transaction was a conditional sale and not a
mortgage, the court in Johnson found the controlling factor to be the absence of an enforceable
debt after the conveyance:
In the case at bar, Clark executes the conveyance, which he calls a "bargain and sale,"
and he accompanies the same by delivery, reserving to himself the right to repay the
purchase money within twelve months. But he executes no covenant by which he ac-
knowledges an indebtedness; nor can it be gathered from the instrument, that there is
any certain obligation on his part to do so. By repaying the money, he had a right to
demand possession of the negroes, but should he fail to do so, where was the remedy of
Johnson? Had he any contract which he could enforce in personam or in rem? We are
of opinion that he had not.
Id. at 342.
55. 206 Ark. at 981, 178 S.W.2d at 245.
56. One case stands out as something of a contradiction to the rule that a deed will be con-
strued as a mortgage only if an intent to secure debt be shown by clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence, and that no deed can be construed as a mortgage unless an enforceable debt survives
the transaction. In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053, 40 S.W.2d 772 (1931), DeLoney executed
a deed to Davis for a recited consideration of $700. By contemporaneous written agreement Davis
gave DeLoney an option to repurchase:
Witnesseth: That it is agreed that at any time on or before October 15, 1930, the said
Hillie Davis will execute and deliver to I.L. DeLoney, or to Cecil Byrd, a warranty deed
free from any and all liens and encumbrances caused by him to the lands this day
deeded to the said Hillie Davis by I.L. Deloney, a copy of which is attached hereto and
made a part of this contract as 'exhibit A' upon the payment to the said Hillie Davis
the sum of $700 with 10 percent interest thereon from this date, and the further pay-
ment to the said Hillie Davis any taxes which he may pay on said lands.
It is further agreed that the said I.L. DeLoney shall have and enjoy the possession
of the said lands and receive the rents and profits thereof for and during the year 1930.
Id. at 1054, 40 S.W.2d at 772. The court found the above language to constitute a mortgage
notwithstanding any explicit evidence of subsisting debt. The only evidence of such debt, and that
upon which the court based its finding that the debt survived the transaction, was the following
excerpt from the cross-examination of Deloney:
Q. Did you ever pay or offer to pay Mr. Hillie Davis the $750 and interest on this land
that you borrowed from him, according to the terms of your contract? A. No, sir, I
haven't had it to pay. Q. You haven't paid it or offered to pay it, have you? A. I haven't
had it to pay. Q. You can answer that question. Have you paid it? A. No, sir. Q. Have
you offered to pay it? A. I guess not; no sir.
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Another factor courts frequently use to determine whether a deed
should be construed as a mortgage is the value of the land as compared
to the amount of the "purchase price." For example, in Clark-McWil-
liams Coal Co. v. Ward 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a
deed reciting a consideration of $20,400 (the amount of the debt to the
grantee) was in actuality a mortgage, largely because the property was
worth between $120,000 and $175,000. In Wimberly v. Scoggin58 the
court determined that a deed to property worth $5000 transferred for
consideration of $879.45 was actually a mortgage. Both cases were de-
cided primarily on the basis of the gross disparity between the value of
the land and the consideration given in exchange for the deed. Con-
versely, one factor persuading the court in Newport v. Chandler59 that
a deed was not a mortgage was the approximate equivalence between
value and consideration. 0
While the presence or absence of a surviving debt and the relation-
ship between the value of the land and the consideration paid are the
two most important factors a court will consider in deciding whether or
not a deed is a mortgage, other facts and circumstances can bear on
the issue. For example, the use of the term "redeem" in the contract
giving a grantor the right to repurchase has been held significant (if not
controlling) in one Arkansas case6 holding a deed to be a mortgage,
since redemption is a term used to denote recovery of land from a
mortgage in default. However, a later case62 held the use of the term
Id. at 1055, 40 S.W.2d at 773.
Note that the thrust of the questioning was whether DeLoney paid Davis money, not whether
it had been borrowed. Certainly one could not predicate a finding that a debt existed based upon a
negative answer to the question of whether money had been paid. It may not have been paid
because it was never owed. At any rate, the question is misleading and whatever evidence there
was of a debt consisted of the words of the questioner, not the witness.
57. 185 Ark. 237, 47 S.W.2d 18 (1932).
58. 128 Ark. 67, 193 S.W. 264 (1917).
59. 206 Ark. 974, 178 S.W.2d 240 (1944).
60. Other cases wherein the value of the land compared to the consideration for the deed was
held to be a factor include: Sturgis v. Hughes, 206 Ark. 946, 178 S.W.2d 236 (1944); Buffalo
Stave & Lumber Co. v. Rice, 187 Ark. 731, 62 S.W.2d 2 (1933); Brewer v. Yancey, 159 Ark.
257, 251 S.W. 677 (1932), and Dicken v. Simpson, 117 Ark. 304, 174 S.W. 1154 (1915).
61. Dicken v. Simpson, 117 Ark. 304, 174 S.W. 1154 (1915). The court, however, pointed to
numerous other factors evidencing a mortgage rather than a conditional sale: the agreement pro-
hibited either party from selling the property during the year following consummation of the con-
tract; the grantee under the contract could "take" the property (buy it) during the year at any
price offered by the grantor; and the consideration for the deed was considerably less than the
value of the land.
62. Matthews v. Stevens, 163 Ark. 157, 259 S.W. 736 (1924).
The word, "redeem," however, has no definite significance. It means to repurchase,
or to regain, and does not necessarily imply the existence of a valid existing indebted-
[Vol. 9:433
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"redeem" insignificant, as meaning no more than "repurchase," at least
where there was no surviving indebtedness from which to redeem.
Other factors courts will consider include prior transactions be-
tween the parties,6" which party pays taxes and insurance after the con-
veyance,"4 and whether the deed was recorded immediately after being
executed or only after default.6
C. Installment Land Contracts
The most commonly used mortgage substitute in seller-financed
sales of real estate is the installment land contract. The buyer agrees to
purchase real estate for a certain price according to a certain payment
schedule. Rather than executing a deed and taking a mortgage in re-
turn as security, the seller retains title and agrees to deliver it only
upon payment of the final installment. The contract will invariably
make time of payment "of the essence" and provide that should the
buyer fail to make timely payment of any installment or breach any
other provision of the contract, the seller will have the option to cancel
the contract and retain all payments previously made as liquidated
damages. The principal differences between the purchase money mort-
gage and the land sale contract are: (1) the buyer builds up no equity
in the property until successful completion of the final payment and (2)
since the buyer has no equity of redemption, there is nothing to fore-
close and thus no right to redeem by a buyer in default who is able to
refinance and pay the accelerated debt.
The extreme remedy of forfeiture is justified by proponents of land
sale contracts as the social price paid to make real estate available to a
person unable to come up with a downpayment or meet the standards
of creditworthiness needed to qualify for a conventional mortgage. A
contract seller is usually willing to sell with no money down and is not
overly concerned with the buyer's ability to pay because the worst that
could happen in the event of default is that the contract would retroac-
tively be converted into a lease. For the buyer who defaults, however,
the price paid for the opportunity to have acquired property is severe.
ness. The mere use of the word "redeem" is not sufficient to make a contract for recon-
veyance a defeasance. If it be shown there was no debt from which redemption might
be made and that the debt has, in fact been extinguished, then the word will be con-
strued as repurchase.
Id. at 161, 259 S.W. at 738.
63. Nelson v. Nelson, 267 Ark. 353, 357, 590 S.W.2d 293, 295 (1979).
64. Buffalo Stave & Lumber Co. v. Rice, 187 Ark. 731, 62 S.W.2d 2 (1933).
65. Gunnels v. Machen, 213 Ark. 800, 212 S.W.2d 702 (1948).
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A buyer who has paid fourteen years on a fifteen year contract has
substantial "potential equity" since he is only one year's payment shy
of a fee simple. Yet, one payment not made on time and he may just as
well have rented for fourteen years.
A fairly typical forfeiture case is Carpenter v. Thornburn.66 There,
Thornburn agreed to "lease" certain land to Carpenter for five years at
$190.70 per year. At the end of that time, upon payment of the last
installment, Carpenter had an option to purchase the land for an addi-
tional $8. Time of payment was made "of the essence" and the agree-
ment provided that should any payment not be made when due, Car-
penter would forfeit all rights under the agreement - including the
option to purchase. Because the option could be exercised for nominal
additional consideration, Carpenter was accumulating equity in the
property. Thus, the contract was really an installment sale rather than
a lease.
The first four "lease" payments were timely made; the fifth was
not, allegedly because Thornburn would not deliver a deed upon tender
of the final installment. The court held that the contract clearly re-
quired the seller's tender of a deed only after prompt payment of all
five installments and the additional tender of the $8 option price - a
condition not complied with.67 Thus, time being "of the essence," eq-
uity would not relieve Carpenter of the forfeiture. Had this agreement
been a mortgage, or had time not been "of the essence," Carpenter
could have saved the land by paying his debt anytime prior to foreclo-
sure. Failing this, foreclosure sale proceeds over and above the amount
of the debt would have been returned to Carpenter.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has often expressed a reluctance to
permit forfeitures: "Equity abhors forfeitures and will seize upon slight
circumstances indicating a waiver, to avoid or prevent them."6 " Not
only will an express or implied waiver of default bar enforcement of a
forfeiture clause, but a court will also refuse enforcement if time is not
made "of the essence," or if the land seller has engaged in conduct
which would make enforcement of the contract inequitable.
For example, in Triplett v. Davis"9 the Arkansas Supreme Court
found that acceptance of two late payments without invoking a forfei-
66. 76 Ark. 578, 89 S.W. 1047 (1905).
67. Id. at 582, 89 S.W. at 1048.
68. Cordell v. Enis, 162 Ark. 41, 44, 257 S.W. 375, 376 (1924). See also Berry v. Crawford,
237 Ark. 380, 373 S.W.2d 129 (1963); Vernon v. McEntire, 232 Ark. 741, 339 S.W.2d 855
(1960).
69. 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964).
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ture clause precluded a land vendor from declaring a forfeiture the
next time a payment was late. The court reasoned that acceptance of
the late payments "lulled" the buyer into believing that further late
payments would be accepted without invoking the forfeiture clause.
Waiver of prompt performance may be shown either by acquies-
cence in late payment or by conduct indicating the seller's intent not to
strictly enforce the contract. For example, in Tyree v. Fowler"0 a land
seller who had cashed an earnest money check after the time stipulated
for the buyer to perform was held to have waived the buyer's lack of
timely performance.
Once a vendor has engaged in conduct amounting to a waiver, the
right to enforce a forfeiture clause may only be reinstated by giving
clear and unequivocal notice to the vendee that the vendor will not
again acquiesce in future late payment or other default and by allowing
the vendee a reasonable time to cure the default.
7
1
The harshness of forfeiture has also been tempered somewhat by
judicial construction of land sales contracts that do not make time "of
the essence." Unless time is either expressly or impliedly made "of the
essence," a land buyer may avoid forfeiture by curing default before
the seller expressly declares a forfeiture. 2
Time may be made "of the essence" by express contractual lan-
guage or by implication arising from the nature of the breach or from
the circumstances of the parties.7 1 In White v. Page7 4 the Arkansas
Supreme Court inferred time to be "of the essence" in a land sale con-
tract calling for the buyer to keep the premises insured, pay taxes, and
make monthly mortgage payments:
These three matters were essential and "time was of the essence" as
to them: a fire occurring during lapsation (sic) of insurance might
destroy most of the security and leave no funds for re-building (sic);
failure to pay taxes might lead to loss of all the property; and Mrs.
Crandall testified that she insisted that the monthly payments be
promptly made on her mortgage.7
While the installment land contract is the only real estate security
70. 247 Ark. 312, 445 S.W.2d 99 (1969).
71. Ashworth v. Hankins, 248 Ark. 567, 452 S.W.2d 838 (1970).
72. Riley v. Warner, 217 Ark. 901, 233 S.W.2d 626 (1950); Feibelman v. Hill, 141 Ark.
297, 216 S.W. 702 (1919); Smith v. Berkau, 123 Ark. 90, 184 S.W. 429 (1916); Butler v. Colson,
99 Ark. 340, 138 S.W. 467 (1911).
73. Three States Lumber Co. v. Bowen, 95 Ark. 529, 129 S.W. 799 (1910).
74. 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
75. Id. at 638, 226 S.W.2d at 976.
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device wherein the secured party may effect a complete forfeiture upon
the buyer's default, the earliest cases in Arkansas treated a species of
executory land sale contract-the "bond for title"76 -as a mortgage for
all purposes. In Smith v. Robinson7 certain land buyers agreed to
purchase property for a stipulated price payable in annual installments.
The land seller executed a bond for $80 to the first purchaser, payable
in the event the seller failed to deliver a valid deed upon payment. 78
The seller executed an instrument to the second purchaser wherein they
agreed to be "bound to the said A.P. Smith, his heirs and assigns, to
convey the aforesaid lots by title deed" upon payment of all the install-
ments when due.
79
Both agreements were eventually assigned to Cummings, who
went into possession of the land. Cummings then conveyed all his inter-
est in the property to trustees to secure payment of a $484.19 promis-
sory note payable to Robinson. The deeds were properly recorded.
Thereafter, Cummings assigned his interest under the land contracts to
Hiram Smith, who paid the contract sellers and received deeds in re-
turn. When Cummings defaulted on his note to Robinson, the trustees
conveyed all their interest in the lots to him. Robinson then sued to
quiet title. The court found Robinson's title superior to any interest of
Smith even though at the time Cummings executed the deed of trust,
he had received no deeds from the land seller.
The court first noted that the contract to convey land had at that
time (1840's) largely replaced the mortgage as the predominant secur-
ity device for seller-financed land sale transactions. Furthermore, the
court believed such contracts were not executory at all:
In general, these brief instruments, neither in their own purport,
nor in that of the usual terms of their assignment, by which they are
commonly transferred from hand to hand, by any means indicate an
76. A bond for title has been distinguished from an installment land contract in that the
latter is a promise to convey at a later date while the former is a present conveyance coupled with
the promise to deliver a deed at a future date. Pulaski Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Carrigan,
243 Ark. 317, 321-22, 419 S.W.2d 813, 816 (1967) (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
77. 13 Ark. 533 (1853).
78.
Now should the above bound commissioners upon the payment of the said consideration
by the said John R. Beeson, make, or cause to be made, a good and valid deed of
conveyance to the said John R. Beeson, or his assigns, for the above described lot or
parcel of ground, conveying all the interest in them vested as commissioners, then and
in that event this obligation to be void and in no force.
Id. at 536.




executory contract, but an executed one. On the contrary, most com-
monly, they recite an actual sale and purchase, its terms as to the
credit given, and express, in some form, an obligation to make title to
the vendee or his assignees, upon the payment of the whole or some
portion of the purchase money. .... 10
The court went on to divine that the real intention of the parties was
the immediate conveyance of an estate encumbered with a lien. The
consequence of the contract being characterized as executed was that it
became, in substance, a mortgage and was treated as such for all pur-
poses. The vendee's interest could not be terminated except by foreclo-
sure of the equity of redemption.81
Since 1853, whether a contract to convey land was treated by the
Arkansas courts as a mortgage (in which case the buyer accumulated
equity and was vested with an equity of redemption which could only
be divested through foreclosure) or was viewed as an installment land
contract (in which case the buyer's interest could be forfeited on de-
fault without foreclosure) depended primarily on whether the agree-
ment between the parties was denominated an executory land contract
or a bond for title. Numerous cases following Smith v. Robinson have
generally held that the bond for title be treated as a mortgage. 82 What
distinguishes the two security devices as to justify the disparate treat-
ment? The short answer is nothing - except form.
The only attempt by the Arkansas Supreme Court to distinguish a
bond for title from an executory land contract occurred in Justice
Fogleman's dissent in Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Carrigan.s" The Court had held that a judgment lien that attached to
the debtor's real estate was subject to a prior executory contract to sell
the land. This meant that the buyer would take the real estate free of
the lien. Justice Fogleman's main point was that an executory contract
to sell did not vest the buyer with or divest the seller of any real estate
80. Id. at 539-40.
81. Id. at 541.
82. Weaver v. Gilbert, 214 Ark. 800, 218 S.W.2d 353 (1949); Williams v. Baker, 207 Ark.
731, 182 S.W.2d 753 (1944); Fine v. Dyke Bros., 175 Ark. 672, 300 S.W. 375 (1927); Judd v.
Rieff, 174 Ark. 362, 295 S.W. 370 (1927); Warren v. Henson, 171 Ark. 162, 283 S.W. 19 (1926);
Fairbairn v. Pofahl, 144 Ark. 313, 222 S.W. 16 (1920); Higgs v. Smith, 100 Ark. 543, 100 S.W.
990 (1911); Roach v. Richardson, 84 Ark. 37, 104 S.W. 538 (1907); Davie v. Davie, 154 Ark.
633, 18 S.W. 935 (1892); Schearff v. Dodge, 33 Ark. 340 (1878); Garrett v. Williams, 31 Ark.
240 (1876); Hall v. Denckla, 28 Ark. 506 (1873); McGehee v. Blackwell, 28 Ark. 27 (1872);
Newsome v. Williams, 27 Ark. 632 (1872); Lewis v. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61 (1871); Kelly v. Dooling,
23 Ark. 582 (1861); Maxwell v. Moore, 18 Ark. 469 (1857); Harris v. King, 16 Ark. 122 (1855);
Moore & Cail v. Anders, 14 Ark. 628 (1854).
83. 243 Ark. 317, 321, 419 S.W.2d 813, 816 (1967) (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
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interest. According to Justice Fogleman, the fictional relationship of
mortgagor and mortgagee often ascribed to vendor and purchaser arose
out of the bond for title.84 The difference between the two types of
documents is that a title bond constitutes a present conveyance with a
promise to deliver a deed at a later date, while the executory contract is
a present promise to convey real estate in the future. It is difficult to
verify this from the cases as a universal principle; the critical language
is simply not usually reproduced.
In Smith v. Robinson" the promise of the seller was "to convey"
the property by deed upon payment by the buyer. However, Justice
Scott, in characterizing the transaction as a mortgage, stressed that the
overriding intent of the parties was to effect an immediate convey-
ance.86 Title was only formally withheld as security for the vendee's
payment. Other cases suggest that the language of the particular trans-
action was one of current conveyance. 87 In any event, Justice Fogleman
seems wrong in stressing the language; Scott seems right in looking to
the intent of the parties to effect a present conveyance as determinative
of whether the withholding of title as security should be treated as a
mortgage. Viewed in this way, the land sale contract clearly should be
viewed as a mortgage since the parties envision a current sale with title
withheld only to secure payment of the price.
One Arkansas case, not relying on any precedent and apparently
never followed nor cited for the particular point again, essentially
equated the executory contract and the bond for title. In Williams v.
Baker,88 Baker, the owner of certain real estate, contracted to sell it to
Bryant for $443.92 payable, $100 cash, and the balance in four annual
installments. The contract provided that if any installments were not
paid when due, "then all of said notes and deferred payments become
due and payable, and any sums paid by him shall be considered rent-
als." 89 Bryant took possession, made some payments, and apparently
defaulted. Baker then brought an ejectment action in circuit court to
obtain possession of the property and recover damages of three years'
rents.90 The lower court found for Baker on both counts.
84. Id.
85. 13 Ark. 533, 536 (1853).
86. Id. at 540.
87. Moore & Cail v. Anders, 14 Ark. 628, 632 (1854). Occasionally a document will both
"convey" and "promise to convey." See Kelly v. Dooling, 23 Ark. 582 (1861).
88. 207 Ark. 731, 182 S.W.2d 753 (1944).
89. Id. at 733, 182 S.W.2d at 754.
90. The three years' rents in question was the rental income apparently collected by the
buyer from his tenants. Id. at 736-37, 182 S.W.2d at 755-56.
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On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that ejectment was an improper remedy and that the case should have
been transferred to equity. The basis of the argument does not appear
in the opinion other than an oblique reference by the circuit judge to
certain "equities" that could only be adjudicated by an equity court.9
At any rate, in an opinion by Justice McFaddin, the supreme court
found it unnecessary to decide the point because no motion to transfer
was ever made at the trial level.
The defendant next argued that ejectment was an improper rem-
edy for recovering possession and damages under an installment land
contract in default and that the plaintiff should have foreclosed the
contract in equity. Justice McFaddin disagreed and sustained the lower
court's jurisdiction to have decided the case. In so doing, he found it
necessary to equate land contracts and bonds for title. His reasoning
was generally a four-step process: 1) a mortgagee may maintain an
ejectment action to recover possession of property after default; 2) the
relationship between vendor and vendee under a bond for title is the
same as that of mortgagor and mortgagee; 3) an executory contract for
the sale of real estate is to be treated the same as a bond for title; and
4) therefore ejectment is an appropriate action for the recovery of pos-
session of real estate under an installment land sale contract in default.
When Baker and Bryant made the contract, whereby Baker
agreed to sell, and Bryant agreed to buy, the property, and Bryant
executed notes for the deferred payments, the transaction was the
same, in law and equity, as if Baker had made Bryant a bond for title.
We have repeatedly held that the relation between the parties in a
bond for title is the same as mortgagor and mortgagee; and that a
mortgagee--on condition broken-may maintain ejectment proceed-
ings to recover possession. "
Apparently, Justice McFaddin was equating installment land con-
tracts with bonds for title in order to sustain the trial court's jurisdic-
tion to decide the matter rather than remand to chancery for a retrial.
However, this may have been unnecessary because Cleveland v. Al-
dridges stands for the proposition that ejectment is an appropriate
91. Id. at 734, 182 S.W.2d at 754.
92. Id. at 734-35, 182 S.W.2d at 754.
93. 94 Ark. 51, 125 S.W. 1016 (1910). However, the three cases upon which the court in
Williams relied as authority, Fears v. Merrill, 9 Ark. 559 (1849); Smith v. Robinson, 13 Ark. 533
(1852); and Newsome v. Williams, 27 Ark. 632 (1872) were all bond for title cases. Oddly
enough, Mr. McFaddin himself relied on Aldridge for authority. Thus, there was really no need to
equate bonds for title with installment land contracts to sustain the trial court's jurisdiction.
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remedy for recovery of possession under an installment land contract in
default. Furthermore, to maintain an action in ejectment requires only
that the plaintiff have both title and the right to possession,9 conditions
that would be met in the case of a vendor under an installment land
contract in default.
Having affirmed the lower court's decision restoring possession to
the vendor, the court in Williams went on to apply mortgage law to the
contract. The court held that a vendor has no claim to rents prior to
default, and after default has the right to rents and profits only for the
purpose of applying them to the debt:
We hold that so much of the judgment as awarded rents was in
error. Baker's right to possession was to enable him to become a mort-
gagee in possession, and thereby apply the rents and profits against
the indebtedness. He could not in the same suit take possession from
the mortgagor, and then have judgment for rents for three years pre-
vious, because the rents, as such, were not included in the mortgage.
The right of Baker to possession as mortgagee under condition broken
was not final until the judgment of the circuit court. The judgment
fixed his right to possession, and he could not recover rents prior to
that judgment.95
What is important about Williams is not so much the result, but that it
was achieved by applying mortgage law to an installment land
contract.
Williams was apparently and inexplicably an aberration. Six years
later in White v. Page" the same Justice McFaddin refused to apply
mortgage law to an installment land contract in default. Emphasizing
that the agreement between the parties was not a bond for title (which
could not be terminated without foreclosure), McFaddin sustained the
lower court's enforcement of a forfeiture clause since such was the in-
tent of the parties and equity would not rewrite the contract.
97
III. Installment Land Contracts: The Need for Reform
The protection given the buyer of real estate under a mortgage (or
bond for title) essentially serves two purposes. First, the requirements
that the mortgage be foreclosed, the property sold, and the proceeds
applied to the debt with any surplus paid to the mortgagor assures that
94. Beloate v. Hathcoat, 208 Ark. 1100, 188 S.W.2d 619 (1945).
95. Williams v. Baker, 207 Ark. at 737, 182 S.W.2d at 755.
96. 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
97. Id. at 637, 226 S.W.2d at 975.
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the mortgagee will be compensated for his damages but receive no
windfall. He will recover exactly what was bargained for-the
purchase price, interest, and cost of collection. Second, the recognition
of a mortgagor's equity of redemption allows a mortgagor to retain the
property by obtaining refinancing and then paying the purchase price
prior to foreclosure. In both cases the primary expectations of the par-
ties are being protected-the buyer gets his property and the seller gets
his money.
The primary expectations of buyer and seller under an installment
land contract are no different. The seller is selling, wants his money,
and is willing to finance the sale. The buyer wants the property but
does not have, or is unwilling to make, a down payment. The seller
retains title as security for the purchase price. This is clearly the func-
tional equivalent of a purchase money mortgage or any other security
device that courts have treated as a mortgage.98 Enforcement of forfei-
ture clauses clearly frustrates rather than advances the primary goals
of both parties to an installment land contract.
Institutional lenders supplying purchase money for real estate are
primarily interested in two things: first, the likelihood that the loan will
be repaid in a timely fashion and second, if there is a default, that the
sale of the collateral will produce enough money to pay off the loan.
The latter interest is served by loan-to-value ratios limiting the percent-
age of appraised value that may be loaned for the acquisition of real
estate. The buyer's down payment provides equity that both cushions
against a foreclosure sale at less than appraised value and provides the
buyer with sufficient stake in the property to encourage maintenance
and upkeep. Legislative or judicial reform is needed to ameliorate the
harshness of forfeiture while at the same time protecting the interests
of lenders. This can be done without depriving poor people of the op-
portunity for no-money-down home ownership.
The installment land contract providing for forfeiture has been
justified as providing a low income consumer who cannot save the down
payment as his only hope for owning a home.9 In the event of default
under these contracts, the seller retains his property and the "rental"
payments received and forfeited as liquidated damages have presuma-
bly provided an adequate return on his investment. Since the recovered
property belongs to the seller and she can do with it whatever she
98. See supra pp. text accompanying notes 31-37.
99. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wise, 58 Hawaii 592, 596, 574 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1978); Comment,
Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L. REV. 71, 75 (1977); Power, Land
Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 399 (1966).
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wishes, the property should either produce appraised value or a return
on appraised value, rather than the forced sale value of a foreclosure.
There is thus no need in an installment land contract for the protective
cushion of the down payment.
It should be obvious that the above "substitute for down payment"
justification makes sense only so long as it takes to serve the purpose.
This would occur when the purchase price has been paid down to the
point where an appropriate loan-to-value ratio exists. Indeed, forfeiture
is not so harsh during the early years of the contract. It is only after
the buyer has built up substantial equity that forfeiture becomes partic-
ularly harsh, and at that time the original justification for forfeiture no
longer exists.' 00
A. Unconscionability of Forfeiture Clauses
Enforcement of forfeiture clauses has also been justified as fur-
thering the legal imperative that contracts be enforced as written.' 10
This makes sense only when the agreement reflects the voluntary inten-
tions of persons of relatively equal bargaining power. Increasingly, the
doctrine of unconscionability has been employed by courts in striking
down contracts where persons of superior bargaining power overreach
persons with little choice over the matter and extract grossly unfair
concessions. 1 2 While the doctrine has a long history,' 03 its codification
in the Uniform Commercial Code for the sale of goods'0 4 has caused
100. Ohio has recognized this in regard to installment land contracts for residential real es-
tate. Contracts are classified in two ways: those less than five years old and on which less than
20% of the principal amount of the purchase price has been paid, and those more than 5 years old
or on which more than 20% of the principal has been paid. The former may be forfeited. The
latter must be foreclosed as mortgages. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05-.08 (Anderson 1981).
Arizona gives a buyer a grace period within which to cure default. The length of the grace period
varies according to amount of the purchase price that has been paid, ranging from 30 days where
20% of the purchase price has been paid to 9 months where 50% or more has been paid. AMz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741, 742 (Supp. 1986).
101. See. e.g., White v. Page, 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
102. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.27 (1982); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLo, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 9-39 to -40 (2d ed. 1977).
103. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 102, § 9-38.
104. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-302 (1961):
Unconscionable contract or clause.-(I) If the court as a matter of law finds the con-
tract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
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courts to become increasingly vigilant in protecting consumers from un-
conscionable contracts, 10 not only under the Code, but in non-Code
contracts as well.10e
Perhaps the most famous statement of the meaning of unconscio-
nability was made by Judge Skelly Wright in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.10 7 According to Judge Wright, unconscionabil-
ity involves "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party."' 10 8 While presence or absence of meaningful choice
was to be determined by looking at all the circumstances surrounding
the contract, two factors were considered particularly important: 1)
gross inequality of bargaining power; and 2) whether the person seek-
ing to avoid the contract had reasonable opportunity to discover and
understand its terms.' 09 The court was finally to determine whether the
terms of the contract were so unfair as to justify refusal of enforce-
ment: "The test is not simple, nor can it be mechanically applied. The
terms are to be considered 'in the light of the general commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case.' "110
Under this test of unconscionability a court would have some diffi-
culty finding a typical land sales contract unconscionable. The court
would have to find that the particular buyer was unable to acquire
traditional financing and had no real choice in the type of financing
deviceused."' Second, the court would have to find that the buyer did
not know nor have the opportunity to determine that forfeiture was the
penalty for default. Finally, the court would have to determine that
forfeiture as a remedy was so unfair as to withhold enforcement. This
would be unlikely, at least in Arkansas, given the widespread use and
acceptance of land sale contracts. Most of the reported cases have fol-
lowed Wright's definition of unconscionability-usually requiring a su-
making the determination.
105. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 102, § 9-39; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 102, §
4.28.
106. For example, in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843, (1967),
the New Jersey Supreme Court held unconscionable a brokerage agreement which made a seller
liable for the broker's commission where a sale failed to be consummated solely because of the
buyer's default. The court implied that § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code was an expres-
sion of public policy that could be applied to all contracts.
107. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 450 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1962)).
Ill. It would seem that many buyers do have a choice. While they may be able to afford
conventional financing, they are persuaded that a no-money-down deal is a better one.
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perior bargaining position coupled with some disability toward being
able to discover or understand the onerous terms of the contract.11
Arkansas appears to follow the Walker-Thomas rule. Two Arkan-
sas Court of Appeals cases have briefly discussed the meaning of un-
conscionability, (without holding the contract in issue unconscionable)
and one Arkansas Supreme Court case has held a contract unconscion-
able without discussing why. In McLarty Leasing System, Inc. v.
Blackshear,"3 the court of appeals held that a lease contract between
two corporations was not unconscionable because there was no showing
the parties were of unequal bargaining power, and in Arkansas Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. Durbin,14 the court of appeals stated that two
important considerations in assessing unconscionability were "gross ine-
quality of bargaining power between the parties to the contract and
whether the aggrieved party was made aware of and comprehended the
provision in question.' 15 The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in
Davis v. Kolb"" that a timber sale contract was unconscionable is not
helpful in that 1) the court concluded unconscionability from the facts
without explaining its reasoning and 2) the conduct of the seller
amounted to fraud. It is thus unlikely that an Arkansas court would
strike down forfeiture clauses as unconscionable per se.
B. Judicial Reform
Several courts have recognized the inequity of forfeiture and have
required that land sale contracts be treated as mortgages and fore-
closed. The most common justification involves the duty of equity to
intervene and prevent the unfairness and injustice of receiving liqui-
dated damages that greatly exceed actual damages. Typically, these
courts are more willing to disrespect the sanctity of a contract which
provides for the unjust enrichment of one of the parties.
For example, in Skendzel v. Marshall,"7 the -Indiana Supreme
Court refused to enforce a forfeiture of the land and all payments
made where the buyer had made timely payments for nearly six years
and had paid a total of $21,000 out of a contract price of $36,000. The
court ordered the contract foreclosed as a mortgage. No one legal the-
112. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 102, § 9-40; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 102, §
4.28.
113. 11 Ark. App. 178, 183, 668 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1984).
114. 3 Ark. App. 170, 623 S.W.2d 548 (1981).
115. Id. at 174-75, 623 S.W.2d at 551.
116. 263 Ark. 158, 563 S.W.2d 438 (1978).
117. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973).
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ory or principle underlay the court's decision; rather, an array of rea-
sons, which can be summarized as follows, was offered:
1. Equity abhors forfeitures. Where a forfeiture is designed to
secure payment of a debt, and, upon default, damages can
be ascertained, a court of equity will relieve the forfeiture
upon the buyer's compensating the seller for the breach by
paying the debt.'
2. Under the facts of the particular case, a forfeiture of
$21,000 as liquidated damages is wholly disproportionate to
the seller's loss and is therefore void as a penalty." 9
3. Under an installment land contract the seller holds title
merely as security for repayment. Equitable title is in the
buyer and the seller has a lien on the real estate for the
purchase price. There is no reason to treat a device which is
the functional equivalent of a mortgage any differently than
a mortgage.120
4. Forfeiture under installment land contracts is nearly identi-
cal to the mortgage remedy of strict foreclosure where the
mortgagee simply retains the property in satisfaction of in-
debtedness. Strict foreclosure has been prohibited in all but
a few jurisdictions. Courts should not allow the prohibition
to be circumvented through the use of installment land
contracts. " '
Skendzel stopped short of requiring that all installment land con-
tracts be foreclosed as mortgages. The court indicated that forfeiture
would be appropriate where the vendee had abandoned the property or
where the vendee had paid very little on the contract.
122
118. Id. at 231, 301 N.E.2d at 644. The court did not analyze extensively why the $21,000
was a penalty rather than fair compensation for breach. Rather, the court quoted at length from
Annotation, Provision in Land Contract for Forfeiture of Payments as One for Liquidated Dam-
ages or Penalty, 6 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949) to make two points. First, while there are a number of
abstract tests for differentiating between damages and penalties, "the ultimate catalyst is the
court's belief as to the equities of the case before it." Id. at 1405. Second, as a general rule,
forfeiture of payments early in a contract where the total amount paid has been small will gener-
ally be construed as damages while forfeiture later in the contract where a high percentage of the
contract price has been paid will generally be construed as a penalty. Id.
119. 261 Ind. at 233-34, 301 N.E.2d at 646-49.
120. Id. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 648. See also G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. supra note I, §§
7.9-.10.
121. 261 Ind. at 240, 301 N.E.2d at 649-50.
122. At least two other courts have held that installment land contracts must be treated as
mortgages. In Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979), the court held that forfeitures
would no longer be enforced and henceforth all installment land contracts would have to be fore-
closed like mortgages. In Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp. of America, 64 Cal. 2d 801,
415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966), the California Supreme Court implied that the buyer
1986-87]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Several jurisdictions, while stopping short of equating installment
land contracts with mortgages, have allowed a vendee one last chance
to avoid the forfeiture by paying the vendor the remaining debt. These
courts have in effect given the vendee an equity of redemption. For
example, forfeiture will be denied in Hawaii if the seller can be com-
pensated with money damages. In Jenkins v. Wise123 the buyer pur-
chased two parcels of real estate for $100,000 and a little over a year
later contracted to sell them for $151,000. He had paid the seller
$16,000 and was in default on two $4,000 payments. While there was
some evidence of bad faith on the part of the seller,124 and some evi-
dence that the seller waived late payment, the court based its decision
on equity's preference for compensation for injury rather than
forfeiture:
The penalty of forfeiture is designed as a mere security, and if the
vendor obtains his money or his damages, he will have received the
full benefit of his bargain. Accordingly, where the vendee's breach has
not been due to gross negligence, or to deliberate or bad-faith conduct
on his part, and the vendor can reasonably and adequately be com-
pensated for his injury, courts in equity will generally grant relief
against forfeiture and decree specific performance of the
agreement. 125
Since the buyer was asking for specific performance and was will-
ing and able to pay the remaining principal, the court was in effect
giving the buyer an equity of redemption. The court stopped short of
decreeing that such a rule be followed any time a buyer has committed
an unintentional default, but held that a court may exercise discretion
to order specific performance depending on whether "forfeiture would
be harsh and unreasonable under the circumstances. 1 26 The court then
gave a list of factors to be considered.
12 7
under an installment land contract in default could require the seller to foreclose the contract as a
mortgage.
123. 58 Hawaii 592, 574 P.2d 1337 (1978).
124. He neglected after request to supply certain information needed to clear the title. Id. at
600, 574 P.2d at 1343.
125. Id. at 597, 574 P.2d at 1341 (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127.
The amount already paid in relation to the total purchase price; the amount and length
of the default; the reasons for the delay; the nature and extent of the improvements, if
any, made upon the premises by the vendee in possession; the expenditures incurred by
the purchasers in good faith reliance upon the agreement of sale; the value of the land
as security for the unpaid balance of the purchase price; and the conduct and equities
of the parties are among the considerations in determining whether a forfeiture would
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MORTGAGE SUBSTITUTES
The greatest obstacle to a court's giving a defaulting buyer an eq-
uity of redemption is the "time-is-of-the-essence" clause. Theoretically,
such a clause contractually justifies the seller's refusal to accept late
payment not only of installments but also of the accelerated debt. In
Rothenberg v. Follman12 8 the Michigan Court of Appeals found the
equivalent of an equity of redemption by refusing to give effect to such
"boilerplate" language. However, the equities so overwhelmingly fa-
vored the vendee that the court may have been simply looking for a
legal theory to support doing equity rather than indicting time-of-the-
essence clauses as contracts of adhesion.
In Rothenberg, at the time of default the buyers had paid $32,500
principal and $9,319.76 interest on property they had purchased for
$40,000. The buyers failed to make a $1725 payment due May 9,
1965. The owners notified the purchasers of their intent to declare a
forfeiture if the default was not cured by September 27. Forfeiture was
declared on October 1. On December 10, the buyers offered to pay the
contract price in full but the seller refused. The lower court ordered
specific performance of the contract and the court of appeals affirmed.
To state the rule of the case simply, a court of equity will relieve a
buyer from a default and order specific performance by the seller when
"to do otherwise would result in an unreasonable forfeiture. 12 9 What
is unreasonable will vary according to the facts of each case, but
among the factors to be considered are "the amount and length of the
default, the amount of the forfeiture, (i.e., the sum of the amounts paid
to the seller and the value of the property at the time of the forfeiture
less the contract price), the reason for the delay in payment, and the
speed with which equity's aid was sought."13 All of these factors were
resolved in favor of the buyer in Rothenberg.131 However, in doing so,
the court found it necessary to justify its failure to strictly enforce the
time-of-the-essence clause.
The court seemed at one point to say that such a clause was essen-
tially meaningless-timing of payments being important only if truly
be harsh and unreasonable under the circumstances.
Id. at 598, n.3, 574 P.2d at 1343 n.3. See also Kaiman Realty Inc. v. Carmichael, 65 Hawaii 637,
655 P.2d 872 (1982); K.M. Young & Assoc. Inc. v. Cieslik, 4 Haw. App. 657, 675 P.2d 793.
128. 19 Mich. App. 383, 172 N.W.2d 845 (1969).
129. Id. at 389, 172 N.W.2d at 848.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 390, 172 N.W.2d at 849. The buyers had substantial equity in the property which
made the forfeiture severe, the buyers tendered full payment of the remaining balance within two
months of the forfeiture, the buyers sought equity's aid within a relatively short time after forfei-
ture, and the amount of default was small.
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important, separate, and apart from the contract's assertion that it is
important: "Just because the parties have declared that time shall be of
the essence does not necessarily make it so. The parties cannot by use
of labels convert an apple into an orange. It is the business of courts to
look through form to substance. 1 3 2 The court also looked at the clause
as an invalid attempt to oust a court of equity of its jurisdiction.
133
Such a clause was "but one of the factors to be taken into consideration
in determining whether equity will intervene, ' 13 4 and in conjunction
with a forfeiture clause, an unreasonable attempt to liquidate dam-
ages. 18 Cutting through all the scattershot, the court seemed to be say-
ing that the demands of equity supersede any time of the essence lan-
guage in a land sale contract.
Other states that have apparently recognized an equity of redemp-
tion in installment land contracts include Missouri, 36 Florida,'3 7 and
perhaps California,'3 8 depending on the court's view of the equities of
the parties.
The provision of an installment land contract which provides that
in the event of default the vendee forfeits not only the land, but all
132. Id. at 391, 172 N.W.2d at 849-50. The court went on to say in a footnote:
Based on our own professional experience as practicing lawyers, we take judicial
notice of the fact that time is generally not regarded as of the essence in the ordinary
land contract and that no greater diligence in payment is expected or in fact forthcom-
ing depending on whether a printed form containing the time essence clause or one
without it happens to have been used.
Id. at 391 n.14, 172 N.W.2d at 850 n.14.
133. Id. at 391-92 n14, 172 N.W.2d at 850 n.14.
134. Id. at 392, 172 N.W.2d at 850.
135. Id. at 393-94, 172 N.W.2d at 851.
136. In Parkhurst v. Lebanon Publishing Co., 356 Mo. 934, 204 S.W.2d 241 (1947), the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to enforce a forfeiture where an installment payment was seven
days late, the vendor's actual damages were 15-20 cents, and the buyer stood to lose an investment
of around $4,000. The court cited Cheney v. Libby, 134 U.S. 68 (1890), for the proposition that
even if time is made of the essence, equity will forgive a short delay in making a payment if no
circumstances have intervened as to render specific enforcement of the contract inequitable. While
both Parkhurst and Cheney involved payment of the accelerated debt, to avoid the forfeiture, the
language of Cheney can be read as giving the buyer the right to avoid forfeiture by curing default
within a reasonable time. Parkhurst was followed in Nigh v. Hickman, 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo.
App. 1976) (buyer had paid 35% of contract price and was 15 days late in tendering payment). In
Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. App. 1977) the court refused to enforce a forfeiture where
the buyer had paid $83,000 of the purchase price and owed $5,633.28. The court neither relied on
nor mentioned Parkhurt or Cheney and rested its decision on the conclusion that the forfeiture
amounted to damages grossly disproportionate to loss and was thus an invalid penalty.
137. Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1975).
138. Compare Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949) and MacFadden v.
Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971) with Kosloff v. Castle, I IS Cal.
App. 3d 369, 171 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1981).
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payments previously made, may be challenged as an unlawful penalty
rather than a reasonable attempt to liquidate damages. The general
rule is that to qualify as valid liquidated damages rather than a pen-
alty, the prospective damages must 1) appear uncertain or difficult to
ascertain, and 2) be either a reasonable estimate of anticipated future
damages or a reasonable forecast of damages that have actually oc-
curred.139 Thus, if damages for breach are difficult to anticipate or esti-
mate at the time the contract is entered into, the liquidated damages of
retention of payments already made will be sustained even though at
the time of breach the damages are easily calculable and are less than
the liquidated damages. Some jurisdictions following the majority rule
will take a "second look" and evaluate reasonableness at the time of
the breach in two situations. The first is when no actual damages are
sustained even though the estimate in the contract was reasonable. 4"
This will often be the case in executory real estate sales agreements
which commonly provide for forfeiture of earnest money in the event of
the buyer's default.' 4 ' Any default will occur so soon after entering the
contract that the seller will suffer little if any damage from deprecia-
tion of the property or loss of possession. Courts may also take a "sec-
ond look" where actual damages turn out to be grossly disproportionate
to liquidated damages. 42 Arkansas generally appears to follow the ma-
jority rule by refusing to order restitution of the amount that liquidated
damages exceed actual damages. For example, in Nelson v. Jones-
boro,"43 the Arkansas Supreme Court enforced a forfeiture of $500
where it was claimed actual damages were only $30. And in Black-
wood v. Liebke,"44 the court stated the general rule:
It is argued that the landowner is not damaged. That his trees have
increased in value, and that he is seeking to exact a higher price
therefor than they were worth at the time he made the contract, and
yet retain the trees. And it is further argued that where the damages
are capable of ascertainment, the amount fixed will be disregarded,
although declared to be liquidated damages. But the question is not as
to the status of the parties at the time when the contract terminated,
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979); J. CALARMARI & J. PERILLO.
supra note 102, § 14-31, at 565; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 149-
150 (1935); 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 214 (1965).
140. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 102, § 14-31 at 566.
141. See, e.g., Williams v. Cotten, 14 Ark. App. 80, 684 S.W.2d 837, (1985); Mclllvenny v.
Horton, 227 Ark. 826, 302 S.W.2d 70 (1957).
142. Stonebroker v. Zinn, 286 S.E.2d 911 (W.Va. 1982).
143. 57 Ark. 168, 20 S.W. 1093 (1893).
144. 87 Ark. 545, 113 S.W. 210 (1908).
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but as to the status of the parties at the time they made the contract.
It may be, as the contract works out, that it would be easy to ascer-
tain the damages for the breach of it, or to prove that there were
none. But if the status of the parties at the time of the contract was
such that it would be difficult or impossible to have anticipated the
damage for a breach of it, and there was a positive element of dam-
age, then under the authorities there is no reason why that may not be
anticipated and contracted for in advance. 1 5
If, however, the disparity between actual damages and liquidated dam-
ages is too great, the court is likely to take a "second look" and invali-
date the clause as punitive and not compensatory.
14 6
Several jurisdictions have recognized a vendee's right to restitution
in cases when a vendor's damages are less than the liquidated damages
of the combined forfeiture of the land and all amounts already paid
under the contract. When a vendee fails to perform a land sales con-
tract, the vendor is injured in that he has lost whatever benefit his con-
tract would have produced. Thus, the measure of the vendor's damages
would be that amount which would "put the plaintiff in the position he
would have been in had the contract been fulfilled."'14 7 Had the con-
tract been completed, his benefit would have been the contract price
with interest for the privilege of paying it in installments. Since he
must now enter a new contract to reap this benefit, his damages will be
the difference between the contract price and the market value Of the
property at the time of the breach. 1 8 The vendor is also entitled to
compensation for the loss of the use of the property for the time the
vendee is in possession of the property-usually measured by its fair
rental value."1 9 Other consequential damages would include expenses of
any subsequent resale, such as the cost of an abstract, real estate com-
mission, revenue stamps, escrow fee, and costs of surveying the
property. 50
As a general rule, a vendee in default is not entitled to a return of
145. Id. at 553, 113 S.W. at 212-13.
146. See, e.g., Williams v. Cotten, 14 Ark. App. 80, 684 S.W.2d 837 (1985) (forfeiture of
$20,000 on $120,000 contract when damages nominal); Mcllvenny v. Horton, 227 Ark. 826, 302
S.W.2d 70 (1957) (forfeiture of $1,200 on $6,300 contract when actual damages $460).
147. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 102 § 14-4; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 139, §
137.
148. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 159, § 186; 77 AM. JUR. 2D. Vendor and Purchaser § 489
(1975).
149. See Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1961); see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.11 (1973).
150. See, e.g., Ashurst v. Rosser, 275 Ala. 163, 152 So. 2d 240 (1963); Mcllvenny v. Horton,
227 Ark. 826, 302 S.W.2d 70 (1957).
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any amount he has paid, even in the absence of a forfeiture clause. 151
This has been justified by reasoning that a down payment was an in-
centive to perform rather than a penalty, 152 or that a party ought not
be given a cause of action based on his own default. 53 In many juris-
dictions, however, courts are increasingly willing to allow a vendee to
recover in restitution any sum by which the amount he has paid under
the contract exceeds the vendor's damages. These courts reason that
such damages are an invalid penalty, 54 as involving the unjust enrich-
ment of the seller, 15 5 or as producing an "unconscionable" result. 5
Idaho courts will order restitution to a defaulting vendee where
liquidated damages are found to be disproportionate to actual damages.
In Graves v. Cupic" 7 the vendees paid $14,500 as a down payment on
a restaurant/tavern which they agreed to buy for $50,000. The remain-
der was to be paid out in monthly installments. The contract contained
the usual "time-of-essence" and forfeiture clauses. When the vendee
applied for a transfer of the liquor license, she was turned down be-
cause she was a resident of Alaska. She then sued to rescind on the
ground of mental incompetence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The
defendant-seller generally denied the allegations of the complaint, and,
since the plaintiff had ceased making payments when she was told she
could not have a liquor license, counterclaimed for breach. The lower
court found for the defendant and ordered that all money paid by the
plaintiff could be kept by the defendant as liquidated damages. The
Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that the liquidated damages
amounted to an invalid penalty.
The court cited the earlier Utah cases of Perkins v. Spencer"" and
Bramwell Inv. Co. v. Uggla'59 for the proposition that a contract pro-
viding for liquidated damages is enforceable only if they are not dispro-
151. See 77 AM. JuR. 2D. Vendor and Purchaser § 499 (1975); Annotation, Modern Status
of Defaulting Vendee's Right to Recover Contractual Payments Withheld by Vendor as For-
feited, 4 A.L.R.4TH 993 (1981); Scott v. Foppe, 247 N.C. 67, 100 S.E.2d 238 (1957); Seekins v.
King, 66 R.I. 105, 17 A.2d 869 (1941).
152. Linster v. Regan, 108 III. App. 2d 459, 248 N.E.2d 751 (1969).
153. Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
154. Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954).
155. Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 435 A.2d 1022 (1980).
156. Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977). Other authorities take the position that
the defaulting vendee may be entitled to restitution in a particular case. 5A A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1122 (1964): 12 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1473 (3d ed. 1970).
157. 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954).
158. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
159. 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913 (1932).
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portionate to the damages actually sustained.10  Here, since there was
no depreciation of property value during the interim between the exe-
cution of the contract and its breach, the only damage sustained by the
seller was the loss of the use of the property during the time the vendee
was in possession. This was calculated to be $3,714.98-the fair rental
value of the property. The $14,500 retained by the seller as liquidated
damages was clearly disproportionate and the court ordered restitution
of $10,758.02.
Defaulting vendees in cases since Cupic have been less successful.
In Miller v. Remior'6 ' the buyer had paid $10,578.76 out of a total
contract price of $29,844.25. The buyer was denied restitution because
the rental value of the property for the four years that the buyer was in
possession amounted to $7,600, but because of some evidence of addi-
tional property damage to the seller, the liquidated damages were held
not disproportionate to the actual damages. In another case, it appears
that the vendees would have been awarded restitution had they asked
for it. 162 Two other cases were remanded to the trial court with instruc-
tions to determine whether amounts forfeited under the contract were
invalid penalties warranting restitution to the vendee. 6 '
Utah will also grant restitution to a defaulting vendee in an appro-
priate case. The first case to reach this conclusion was Malmberg v.
Baugh"" where a total of $4,450 was paid on a $10,000 contract that
had no forfeiture or liquidated damages clause. The court found that
the vendees' breach had been occasioned by a good-faith belief that the
sellers had induced their entry into the contract through misrepresenta-
tions, and held that the vendees could recover in restitution the excess
of their payments over the sellers' damages.1
65
Several years later, the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce a
160. 75 Idaho at 457, 272 P.2d at 1024.
161. 86 Idaho 121, 383 P.2d 596 (1963).
162. Clampitt v. A.M.R. Corp., 109 Idaho 145, 152, 706 P.2d 34, 41 (1985). Ellis v. Butter-
field, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977). Default occurred during the sixth year of the ten-year
contract. A total of $8,000 principal and $7,000 interest had been paid on property purchased for
$17,000 and for which the total of payments would have been $24,000. Id. at 657, 570 P.2d at
1347 (Bistline, J., dissenting). The vendees' offer to redeem after default by tendering the acceler-
ated debt of $9,000 plus costs was refused, and the vendees sued for specific performance. Restitu-
tion was not asked for on appeal. The latest Idaho decision found that the seller's damages
roughly equalled the amount forfeited and therefore held that enforcement of the forfeiture clause
was not unconscionable.
163. Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962); Howard v. Bar Bell Land
& Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d 103 (1959).
164. 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923).
165. Id. at 341, 346, 218 P. at 979-80.
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forfeiture and liquidated damages clause where the vendee had paid
$6,300 on a contract price of $6,500.1" The court's opinion may be
read either as denying enforcement of liquidated damages clauses in
any case where damages may easily be ascertained, or as denying en-
forcement because the amount of liquidated damages compared to the
damages sustained was "not in accord with equity and good
conscience. ' '1
67
By 1952, the Utah Supreme Court had adopted a traditional liqui-
dated damages/penalty doctrine and refused to sustain a forfeiture
where $2,725 had been paid on a contract price of $10,500, and default
occurred only four months after the contract was executed.1 68 The
court, purporting to follow the Restatement,1 6' found both that the
amount forfeited was not a reasonable forecast of actual damages and
that the actual damages suffered could be readily determined. 17 0 A
concurring opinion argued that, under the Restatement, no liquidated
damages could ever be awarded for breach of an installment land con-
tract since damages are always easily susceptible of ascertainment
when that type of contract is breached. 71
In later cases, the Utah Supreme Court has seemed to adopt a
much harsher attitude toward defaulting vendees, refusing forfeiture
only when the disparity between liquidated and actual damages is so
great as to shock the conscience of the court. In Carlson v. Hamilton72
the trial court's award of restitution to a defaulting vendee, where his
payments exceeded the seller's damages by $2,119.94 (the buyer had
paid $6,680 on a $22,000 contract), was reversed by the supreme court
on the ground that the result was not "so unconscionable that no de-
cent, fairminded person would view the ensuing result without being
possessed of a profound sense of injustice .... ,17
166. Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935).
167. Id. at 21, 40 P.2d at 202.
168. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
169. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
(I) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not en-
forceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the breach,
unless (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the
harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one
that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.
Id.
170. Perkins, 121 Utah at 477-78, 243 P.2d at 450-51.
171. Id. at 479, 243 P.2d at 453-54 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring.)
172. 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958).
173. Id. at 275, 332 P.2d at 991.
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However, in Johnson v. Carman,174 the Utah Supreme Court sus-
tained an order of restitution to a defaulting buyer where actual dam-
ages were $25,650, liquidated damages were $34,596.10, and the total
contract price was $170,000. The court, while purporting not to estab-
lish any benchmark, held the liquidation of damages provision uncon-
scionable because the seller would retain an amount thirty-four percent
greater than the actual damages sustained.1 75 The court also relied on
the Restatement's position that liquidated damages should be disal-
lowed where exact damages are calculable, since calculated damages
almost always produce a fairer result than estimated damages.17 6
One interesting feature of Johnson is the manner in which the
lower court calculated the seller's loss of use damages. Traditionally,
courts compensate the seller for his loss of use of the property for the
time the buyer was in possession by offsetting the fair rental value
against the payments made by the buyer. 177 In Johnson, the trial judge
measured the loss-of-use damages by giving the seller interest on the
unpaid portion of the purchase price. This was approved as an appro-
priate way to measure damages.
17 8
C. Legislative Reform
In recent years legislatures have become increasingly concerned
with alleviating the harshness of forfeiture. The legislative trend, like
the judicial trend, is to treat installment land contracts as mortgages.
174. 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977).
175. Id. at 373.
176. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932)).
177. See Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1961); see also D. DOBBS, supra note 149.
178. 572 P.2d at 374. The dissenting opinion by Justice Ellett in Johnson argued that rental
value should have been used. While no findings as to rental value had been made by the trial
court, Ellett applied a "'rule-of-thumb" that rent is calculated at 1% of the value of the property
per month of use (12% per year). Id. at 374 (Ellett, C.J., dissenting). This would result in net
damages to the purchaser of $3,845 which was only 2.2% of the purchase price-an amount that
should not have shocked the court's conscience. Why Ellett chose a ratio of net damages to total
purchase price as an unconscionability benchmark was not stated. It should be noted that the use
of Ellett's fair rental value as the measure of the seller's loss would lower the majority's bench-
mark of actual damages as a percentage of liquidated damages from 34% to 13%--an amount the
majority would likely have found acceptable. Other Utah cases have produced little in the way of
guidance as to what is or is not unconscionable. In Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981),
the buyer had paid $23,216 ($3,507 interest and $19,709 principal) on a contract price of
$40,000. The Utah Supreme Court sustained the lower court's order that the vendor repay the
vendee $14,121, the amount by which actual damages exceeded liquidated damages. In Soffe v.
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983), the court affirmed an order of restitution where liquidated
damages were $20,725 and actual damages $5,895.
MORTGAGE SUBSTITUTES
Florida 179 and Oklahoma 80 require such contracts to be treated the
same as mortgages for all purposes. This means that the interest of the
buyer can not be forfeited, but must be foreclosed. Ohio requires fore-
closure (with excess proceeds over and above the debt payable to the
buyer) if more than twenty percent of the purchase price has been
paid.' In Washington, the court has discretion to block forfeiture and
order foreclosure if it finds that the fair market value of the property
substantially exceeds the unpaid price owed by the buyer.
1 82
A number of states have enacted arrearages statutes. 183 A buyer in
default may prevent a forfeiture by paying off all money due and owing
as of the time of default. The length of time within which cure may be




When a buyer and a seller enter into an agreement for the convey-
ance of land, each have different intentions and expectations. The
buyer hopes to receive protection for the equity he is building up over
the course of the contract and, upon making the last payment, expects
to receive good title to the property. The seller, on the other hand, in-
tends to sell his property for a particular price. He calculates the pay-
ments to provide an appropriate rate of return as compensation for
deferral of payment. The seller's expectation is to receive his calculated
rate of return.
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.01 (West 1969).
180. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § IIA. (West 1986).
181. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Anderson 1981).
182. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9 61.30.120 (Supp. 1987).
183. Arizona-ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-742(D) (Supp. 1986) (If the amount paid is less
than 20% of the contract price, 30 days; if between 20% and 30%, 60 days; if between 30% and
50%, 120 days; if over 50%, 9 months); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. §§ 656.2, .4 (West Supp. 1986)
(30 days); Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West Supp. 1987) (30 to 90 days depending
on when contract entered into and the amount of contract price paid); North Dakota-N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-18-04 (1976) (6 months if the amount due on contract is more than 66 2A% of original
indebtedness; in all other cases, one year); Ohio-OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05, .07 (Ander-
son 1981 ) (Forfeiture permitted after 30 days only where contract less than five years old and less
than 20% of price paid); Oregon-OR. REV. STAT. § 93-915 (1985) (60 to 120 days depending on
percentage of purchase price paid); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 904 (Purden 1965)
(30 days where default was failure to make payment when due; 60 days for other defaults);
Texas-TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.061-.063 (Vernon 1984) (15 to 60 days depending on per-
centage of contract price paid); Washington-WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.30.070 (Supp. 1986)
(90 days unless a greater period is specified in the contract).
184. IowA CODE ANN. § 656.2 (West Supp. 1986).
185. ND. CENT. CODE § 32-18-04 (1976).
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The traditional mortgage furthers these different intentions and
expectations. Upon default, the buyer's equity is protected by being
given an opportunity to redeem the property before foreclosure and the
seller, in the event the buyer does not redeem, may have the property
sold to recover his money. The buyer is then entitled to keep any excess
over the amount of the debt. Payments received have compensated the
seller both with interest and a return of principal.
Enforcement of forfeiture clauses in installment land contracts
does fundamental injustice to these expectations and effectively con-
verts the agreement into a lease. Had the seller wished to rent the
property at the outset, the rental payments would presumably have
been lower than those necessary to retire the indebtedness created
under the contract. Allowing the seller to retain the purchase payments
as a substitute for loss of rent overcompensates the seller. More impor-
tantly, enforcement ignores the buyer's acquisition of equity and works
an extreme injustice on the buyer, especially in the late years of the
contract. The justification that forfeiture is the price paid for no-
money-down financing has weight only in the very early years of the
contract. After that the seller has effectively received his down
payment.
The courts have protected these interests in deeds intended as se-
curity, deeds of trust, and bonds for title by treating them as mort-
gages. The Uniform Commercial Code treats all personal property se-
curity devices as security interests. 186 Only the installment land
contract has evaded similar treatment. This can only be justified as
blind adherence to history and tradition since the installment land con-
tract serves the same purpose as a seller held mortgage. If the install-
ment land contract were treated as a mortgage, the seller would get
what he bargained for, the principal amount of the indebtedness plus
interest, without the windfall of forfeiture; and the buyer would get
what he bargained for-protection of his equity and title to the prop-
erty upon completion of the contract. Many jurisdictions have ad-
dressed the problem and it is time for the Arkansas courts and the
legislature to follow suit and reform the installment land contract so
that the seller receives no more than his bargain and the buyer is ade-
quately protected.
186. U.C.C. § 9-102(I)(a) (1972).
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